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Abstract 
 
This study examines the effect of fair value model versus historical cost model 
for investment property on audit fees. Using China’s real state firms data from 
2007-2014, controlling for other determinants of audit fees, this study finds that audit 
fees are higher for firms reporting investment property at the fair value model relative 
to those reporting investment property at the cost model. This study also finds that 
firm reporting investment properties at the fair value located in the cities with active 
markets leads to lower audit fees than those located in the remote areas with less 
active markets. This study does not find that investment property valued under the 
fair value model audited by industry specialist leads to higher audit fees than 
investment property audited by non-industry specialist. Finally, this study provides 
evidence that firms use external appraisers to monitor the fair value estimates of 
investment properties leads low audit fees. Overall, our result suggests that fair value 
measurements leads to lower audit fees in the developed regions relative to less 
developed regions. 
 
Keywords: Fair value model, cost model, investment property, audit fees, industry 
specialist, appraiser. 
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1.Introduction 
Motivated by the debate on the costs and benefits of adopting fair value 
accounting, and the adoption of IAS 40 investment property that permit managers to 
choose either the fair value model or the cost model to report firms’ investment 
property, this study investigates the effect of fair value model versus historical cost 
model for investment property on audit fees in the developing country. In particular, 
this study examines whether investment property valued under the fair value model 
located in the developed (e.g., big city) regions leads to lower audit fees than 
investment property located in the less developed (e.g., remote city) regions. This 
study also investigates whether investment property valued under the fair value 
model audited by external industry specialist leads to higher audit fees than those 
audited by non-industry specialist. Finally, this study examines whether the fair value 
estimates of investment property under fair value model conducted by external 
appraiser leads to lower audit fees than that conducted by managers.  
Using a sample of China’s real estate firm during 2007-2014, the study finds 
that audit fees are higher for firms’ investment property valued at the fair value model 
relative to investment property valued at the cost model, however, this study finds 
that audit fees are lower for firms reporting investment property located at the 
developed areas relative to less developed areas. This study also finds that the use of 
external appraisers has significantly negative relations with audit fees. The negative 
association supports the view that the appraisers provide higher-quality audits of fair 
value estimate of investment property which reduces auditors’ efforts and lower the 
monitoring cost, compared to the fair value of investment property monitored by 
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internal appraiser. This study does not find that investment property valued under the 
fair value model audited by industry specialist leads to higher audit fees than 
investment property audited by non-industry specialist. Overall, the study provides 
evidence that investment property valued at fair value model leads to higher audit 
fees unless the fair value estimates are reliable. This study also provides evidence that 
the audit fees reduce for firm employing external appraiser.  
Prior studies suggest that the cost of IFRS implementation in the developed and 
underdeveloped markets and the complexity of auditing fair value estimates and risk, 
and audit’s business risk and audit effort are related to audit fees (Hay et al., 2006). 
De George, et al. (2013) document that the compliance costs increases for 
publicly-traded Australian firms following the IFRS adoption due to the complexity 
of IFRS-exposure regarding to fair value measurement. Some researchers document 
that audit fees for European property firms after IFRS adoption is lower for firms’ 
properties reported based on fair value model than that property reported at 
depreciated cost subject to impairment test (Goncharov, Riedl, and Sellhorn., 2014). 
Some researchers document that firms in the United Kingdom and Australia are more 
likely to adopt historical cost or modified historical cost model which recognized fair 
value assets in the balance sheet other than employ fair value model which 
recognized the changes in fair value of assets in the income statement. Their finding 
implies that the benefit of adoption of fair value measurement does not exceed its 
costs (Cairns, Massoudi, Taplin, and Tarca, 2011). Based on prior studies, it’s not 
clear whether employing fair value measurement would increase audit fees in the 
developed and less developed regions, whether adoption of fair value measurement 
makes the costs exceed its benefits. 
The explanation for the increased of audit fees after IFRS adoption may relate to 
IFRS are principle-based standards, the primary focus of IFRS is on fair value 
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measurement which provides managers substantial discretion in accounting choices 
and requires more professional judgement in the financial reporting process which 
increases risk of reporting errors, in particular when the market data is not available. 
Therefore, auditors need to put more efforts to manage the risk that comes from fair 
value measurements (Hail, Leuz and Wysocki 2009; De George, Ferguson, and Spear 
2013; Bratten et al., 2013).  
Prior studies document that if fair value estimates are less verifiable or thin 
trading in the markets, the fair value can be distorted (Laux and Leuz, 2009). 
Therefore, auditors may need to put more efforts to verify the fair value estimate to 
avoid material misstatements risk. For instance, the inputs of fair value estimate 
based on Level 3, driven from unobservable inputs by discounted from cash flows 
analysis, may require more auditors’ effort than that of the observable inputs 
(Ettredge, Xu, Yi., 2014; Goncharov, Riedl, and Sellhorn., 2014). Audit fees, 
therefore, are likely to be various with the level of task difficulty of auditing fair 
value estimates in the liquidity and illiquidity markets. IAS 40 provides managers 
opportunity to influence the inputs of fair value estimates and quoted prices of 
property when the market is illiquidity or identical property is not available.  
A number of studies focus on investigating whether IFRS adoption or 
employing fair value accounting increase value relevance of accounting information 
(Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Barth et al., 2008; He et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2012). 
Barth et al. (2008) find firms adopting international accounting standards exhibit 
more value relevance of accounting information and more timely loss recognition by 
comparing firms that apply local GAAP in 21 countries. Some researchers suggest 
that the effect of IFRS adoption in the mature market can be different from the 
emerging market. They find that adopting fair value accounting in the emerging 
market does not increase the value relevance of accounting information due to the 
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institutional factors, such as, ineffective institutional infrastructure may affect the 
application of fair value accounting and shape financial reporting incentives (He et al., 
2012). Therefore, Implementation of fair value accounting in the emerging market is 
challenge for auditing fair value estimates due to lack of well-function infrastructure 
to support the reliable fair value inputs. The association, therefore, between audit fees 
and fair value measurements can be very in the developed market and less developed 
market. 
Few studies explore the issue regarding to IFRS adoption and audit fees and the 
empirical results are mixed. Using publicly-traded Australian companies as sample, 
De George, et al. (2013) examine the compliance costs of IFRS and audit fees. They 
find the compliance costs of IFRS increases following with audit complexity of 
IFRS-exposure at the time of transition to IFRS. Using the banking data during 
2008-2011, Ettredge, Xu, Yi. (2014) examine the association between audit fees and 
bank’s fair valued assets measured at fair value using Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 
inputs. They find that audit fees are positively associated with the proportion of 
bank’s fair-valued assets. In particular, they find audit fees are more significantly 
associated with the proportions of the least verifiable fair-valued assets measured by 
Level 3 input than that measured by Level 1 and Level 2 inputs. Using European 
property firms after reporting of fair-valued property is compulsory, Goncharov, et al., 
(2014) find that firm’s audit fees is lower for property reported at fair value than that 
property reported at depreciated cost subject to impairment test. They also find that 
audit fees are positively associated with both for the recognition of fair-valued assets 
on the balance sheet (versus disclosure fair-valued assets in the footnotes) and more 
complex of estimation of fair value. Overall, they suggest that employing fair value 
leads to lower monitoring costs. 
China provides an ideal setting for investigating the association between audit 
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fees and fair value measurement. China substantially converges its accounting 
standards with IFRS since January 1, 2007. Investment property in all Chinese listed 
firms is required to be measured based on Chinese Accounting Standards 3 (CAS 3) 
which is consistent with IAS 40 investment property except that Chinese Accounting 
Standards 3 does not mandate firms that use the cost model to disclose the fair values 
of these investment property in the footnotes. This provides a cleaner test whether 
firm adopting fair value model leads to higher audit fees than that firm employing 
cost model to report investment property. In addition, in order to increase credibility, 
CAS 3 requires firms to stick on the cost model unless the firm can provide evidence 
that the fair value of the investment property can be obtained from an active market 
or through values of similar property in an active market and the fair value estimate is 
reliable. This provides an opportunity to test whether audit fees differ for firms 
applying fair value model in the developed areas versus less developed areas in the 
emerging market.  
This study contributes to the literature on the benefits and costs of fair value 
accounting measurements by examining whether audit fees varies for firms reported 
fair value model (the recognition of the fair values changes in the income statement) 
versus cost model (depreciated cost less accumulated impairment losses) for 
investment properties under IAS 40 in the developing country. More specifically, this 
study contributes to the literature of corporate governance and audit fees by 
investigating the effect of external appraiser on the reliability of fair value estimate 
and audit fees. Our findings provide evidence that the appraisal estimates of fair value 
conducted by independent external appraisers reduces audit risk and audit fees, which 
is an important policy implications for IASB and regulators governing in the 
emerging capital markets, due to under the IAS 40, the estimate of fair value to be 
evaluated by external appraisers is not required but be encouraged [IAS 40.79].  
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     The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
accounting standards of IAS 40 and institutional background of China. Section 3 
reviews prior research and develops hypotheses. Section 4 discusses research design 
and sample selection. Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Accounting standards of IAS 40 and institutional background  
To provide more relevant information to investors about non-financial 
investment assets, the IASB issues IAS 40 investment property allows the use of fair 
value accounting for real estate investment properties, which is effective January 1, 
2005. IAS 40 investment property
1
 provides managers option to select fair value 
model or cost model to evaluate investment property after the initial measurement. 
Under the fair value model, after the initial purchase the investment property is 
reported on the balance sheet at market values [IAS 40.33], with annual change in the 
market value recognized in the income statement [IAS 40.35]. Investment property 
under the cost model is carried at cost less accumulated depreciation and impairment 
losses [IAS 40.56]. Firms using the cost model are required to disclose the fair value 
estimates of investment property in the footnotes, except for certain circumstances 
when the fair value of the investment property is not able reliably estimated. The 
most reliable estimate of fair values is determined by current property prices in an 
active market for similar properties in the same condition and location as well as 
subject to similar lease or other contracts [IAS 40.45]. If there is no appropriate 
reliable market estimate available, firm may use the estimates of the model supported 
by external evidence [IAS 40.46]. However, the estimate of fair value to be evaluated 
                                                     
1 Investment property is defined as land and buildings held to earn rental income or for capital 
appreciation, or both. 
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by external appraisers is not required but be encouraged [IAS 40.79]. 
Under the cost model, the investment property is measured at depreciated cost 
less accumulated impairment losses. Under the fair value model, the changes in fair 
value of investment property should be recognized as gains or losses in the statement 
of the comprehensive incomes. The input of fair value estimates of investment 
property can be gotten form similar property in the active market for the same 
condition and location or from the less active market by discounting future cash flows 
of investment property.  
Effective January 1, 2007, China permits listed firms to choose either using fair 
value model or cost model to measure investment property under Chinese Accounting 
Standards (CAS) 3. CAS 3 is similar to IAS 40 except that CAS 3 does not mandate 
firm employing the cost model to disclose the fair values estimates of the investment 
assets in the footnotes. In addition, CAS 3 requires firms to use the cost model unless 
the firms provide evidence that the fair value estimates of the investment properties 
obtained from through values of similar investment properties in an active market or 
active markets and the fair value estimates are reliable.  
 
3. Prior Research and Hypothesis Development 
This study encompasses two strands of literature: fair value measurement and 
auditing issues, and the factor effects of driver of audit fees. The following sections 
summarize prior literatures in these two areas and then develop testable hypotheses.  
 
3.1. Fair value measurement and auditing fair value estimates 
     Many studies examine whether fair value of tangible long-lived assets and fair 
value financial assets are value relevant in recent years (Barth & Clinch, 1998; 
Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh, 2006; So & Smith, 2009; Lopes and Walk, 2012). Some 
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studies find that the revaluation of tangible assets does not increase value-relevant 
information instead of increasing managerial opportunism (Lopes and Walk, 2012).  
Using U.S. banking-holding firms as sample, Khurana and Kim (2003) find that 
fair value accounting for financial assets is more value relevant than historical cost 
accounting for large bank-holding firms than small bank-holding firms when fair 
value measurements are reliable. However, historical cost accounting is more value 
relevant than fair value accounting for financial assets for small bank-holding firms if 
the financial asset is less reliable when financial assets is not actively traded.  
     Using a sample from New Zealand, Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2006) find that 
the recognition of unrealized gains of properties from changes in fair value in the 
income statement does not provide more value relevant accounting information than 
that recognized in the revaluation reserve in balance sheet. Using China’s data, He, 
Wong, and Young (2009) also find that fair-value-based earnings under IFRS, e.g., 
fair value changes of hedging instruments, trading securities, gains on debt 
restructuring, goodwill impairment loss and investment property, are not value 
relevant. They suggest that fair value estimates are likely to be manipulated by 
management when the market is illiquid. Prior study documents that auditors are 
likely to put more effort to correspond to auditing fair value estimates due to the 
complexity of fair value measurements (Martin et al., 2006) .   
Some study document that firms apply cost model leads to high audit fees than 
firms apply fair value model since firms apply cost model are required to employ 
impairment test and depreciation of investment property, which relates to the 
estimation uncertainty and complexity of audit assets at fair value. Prior studies 
propose that impairment test involve the underlying measurement rely on private 
information and the unverifiable fair value estimate (Burgstahler et al., 2006) which 
provides managers with superior discretion to determinate assets impairment (Zhang 
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and Zhang, 2015). Accordingly, managerial discretion in determining impairment of 
investment properties should increase auditors’ effort in verification that results 
increase audit fees.   
Ettredge et al. (2014) find that firms’ audit fees increase for firms with greater 
use of fair value accounting for financial instruments. Using a sample of UK real 
estate firms and US real estate firms, Goncharov et al. (2014) find that audit fees are 
higher for US real estate firms that report property at historical cost than that for UK 
real estate firms that report property at fair value. They also document that audit fees 
increases in firms with more complexity of fair value estimates and if firms recognize 
the changes in fair value of investment property in the income statement (versus 
disclose fair-valued assets in the footnotes).  
Based on the literature, firms applying fair value model to measure their 
investment property are more likely to increase audit fees due to auditor should 
increase their efforts to verify the reliability of fair value estimates. This, therefore, 
leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Investment property valued using the fair value model leads to higher audit fees 
than investment property under the cost model 
 
3.2. Location of investment property and outside monitors 
Prior study suggests that firm audited in the expensive city will cost more due to 
the city effect (Hay, 2013). However, some studies find that the cost of preparing fair 
value accounting information is higher in less active market than the active market 
(Christensen and Nikolaev, 2013; Ettredge et al., 2014).    
Christensen and Nikolaev (2013) find that managers may select fair value 
accounting over historical cost accounting when the costs of getting reliable fair value 
estimates is low, e.g., for more liquid assets.  Using a sample of banking industry 
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during 2008-2011, Ettredge et al. (2014) examine the association between the 
fair-valued assets and audit fees. They find that the positive association between 
fair-valued assets employing Level 1 or Level 2 inputs and audit fees is lower than 
the positive association between fair-valued assets employing Level 3 inputs and 
audit fees. Their finding suggests that audit fee increases in firms with the greater 
difficulty of verifying fair-valued assets 
Based on prior studies, the compliance cost of IFRS increases for firms with 
great exposure to audit complexity (De George et al., 2013), this study, therefore, 
predicts investment properties located in the developed areas than that in the less 
developed areas leads to lower audit fees due to investment properties located in the 
less developed area increases the audit efforts in verifying the fair value estimates in 
turn increases the audit fees.  
 
H2a: Investment property located in the developed areas valued under the fair value 
model leads to lower audit fees than investment property located in the less 
developed areas. 
 
       Several studies examine the association between auditor industry specialization, 
audit quality and audit fees (Muller & Riedl, 2002; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; 
Reichelt, K. and D. Wang., 2010; Minutti-Meza, 2013; Ettredge, et al., 2014; Francis 
and Gunn, 2015), their results are mixed. Some studies document that appraisal 
estimates of fair value assets conducted by external appraiser show relatively 
reliability than that conducted by managers (Muller and Riedl, 2002) and suggest that 
audit fees are associated with auditor specialization (Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Hay, 
2013). Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) apply Porter’s (1985) theory of differentiation 
and competition to examine the association between the industry specialization and 
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audit fees. They find that audit firms that have higher market shares earn fee 
premiums than their competitors.  
Using within-industry market share as a proxy for industry specialization, 
Reichelt and Wang (2010) find that firms audited by specialist auditor provides better 
quality of financial reporting. Francis and Gunn (2015) also find that firms’ audited 
quality of earnings improved by firms with industry expertise of auditors. However, 
Minutti-Meza (2013) finds that there is no difference in audit quality between firm 
with industry specialist auditors and non-specialist auditors.  
Ettredge, et al. (2014) document that auditor of bank specialist normally 
charges lower audit fees to their clients but they charge more for clients with higher 
proportions of fair-valued assets using Level 2 inputs. Based on the literature, this 
study predicts that auditor expertise charges higher audit fees to firms reporting 
investment property at fair value than those reporting investment property at the cost 
model. 
H2b: Investment property valued under the fair value model audited by industry 
specialist leads to higher audit fees than investment property audited by 
non-industry specialist    
Under the IAS 40 investment property, firms are encouraged to employ 
external appraisers to evaluate fair value estimates [IAS 40.79]. This suggests that 
external appraisers may provide expertise and efforts to evaluate the reliability of fair 
value estimates of property which can reflect potential substitution of audit efforts. 
Most of prior studies suggest that firm employing external appraisers other than 
internal appraisers provide more accurate fair value estimates (Dietrich et al.,2001) 
and lower the information asymmetry (Muller and Riedl, 2002), although Goncharov, 
et al., (2014) find that firms using external monitor, external appraisers, do not reduce 
audit fees. Using a sample of UK property firms, Dietrich et al. (2001) find the 
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estimates of fair value conducted by external appraisers are more accurate than those 
conducted by internal appraisers. Muller and Riedl (2002) also find that accounting 
information asymmetry is lower for firms that the appraisal estimates conducted by 
external appraisers instead of internal appraiser. 
Using a sample of Australia data, Yao et al. (2015) examine whether firm 
employing an independent appraiser lower audit fees by examining the association 
between the revaluation of non-current assets and audit fees. Their findings suggest 
that using independent appraiser reduces audit risk and audit fees.  
Accordingly, this study, therefore, expects that firms’ audit fees are lower when 
the appraisal estimate of fair value are conducted by external appraisers than firms 
that do not to use of external appraisers  
 
H2c: The fair value estimates of investment property under fair value model 
conducted by external appraiser leads to lower audit fees than that conducted by 
managers 
 
3.3. Factors related to audit fees 
     Hay (2013) documents that audit fee is associated to clients attributes, including 
client size, and client complexity which measured by client’s number subsidiaries, 
and auditor attributes, e.g., audit firm tenue, and engagement attributes, e.g., audit 
opinion and non-audit service. Therefore, this study also controls for audit firm tenue, 
audit opinion, and non-audit fees.  
 
4. Research design  
4.1. Research method 
To test H1, whether investment property valued using the fair value model 
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leads to less audit fees than investment property under the cost model, we employ the 
model (1) below.  
LogAF = ß 0 +ß1 NAF +ß2CostIP + ß 3 FVIP + ß 4Impair_D + ß 5 LOSS + ß 6 AR/TA 
 + ß 7 LEV + ß 8 OTH IMP_D + ß 9 INTANG + ß 10 L DEBT + ß 11 ACC  
+ ß 12 CA/CL +ß 13 OPIN + ß 14 CONCER + ß 15 OTH FV AL + ß 16 TOTSUB  
+ ß 17 TENURE + ß 18 BIG 4 + ß 19LIST + ß 20 YEAR D L+ e           (1)  
 
Cost IP and FVIP are the test variables, Cost IP is investment property reported at the 
depreciated cost under the cost model of IAS 40, which captures audit efforts 
associated with reporting the depreciated cost.. FVIP is investment property reported 
under the fair value model which captures the auditor efforts associated with the 
recognition of the changes in fair value of investment property in the income 
statement on audit fees. Impair_D captures audit efforts associated with the report of 
impairment charge on audit fees. This study expects that the coefficient of FVIP is 
positive (i.e. β3 > 0) if Investment property valued using the fair value model leads to 
higher audit fees than investment property valued under the cost model. 
CONTROL is the control variable which relates to characteristics of the firm 
and the audit firms are borrowed from George, et al. (2013). CONTROL is control 
variable including audit complexity. Prior studies suggest that audit fees are 
positively associated with audit complexity, e.g., accounting receivables, accruals, 
subsidiaries, and firms size (De George et al., 2013; Goncharov, et al., 2014), and 
firms’ risk (Stice, 1991). To capture audit complexity, this study includes accounting 
receivables (AR/TA), absolute value of accruals, (ACC), intangibles (INTANG), and 
number of subsidiaries (TOTSUB), the audit fee is expected to be higher for firms 
with these characteristics, therefore, the expected signs on these coefficients are 
positive. This study expects the sign of the non-audit fees (NAF) is positive due to the 
complementary association between statutory audit fees and non-audit service fees 
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(De George et al., 2013). Prior study suggests that auditing risk can be measured by 
firms’ liability (Whisenant et al., 2003), this study, therefore, expects a positive 
association between higher audit fees with risk exposure relating to current ratio and 
long term debt (CA/CL , L DEBT), and the litigation risk, e.g., negative earnings and 
modified opinion (LOSS, OPIN). This study predict the sign of audit firm tenure 
(TENURE) is negative due to the long-term business relationship between CPA firms 
with their client may offer efficient service and charge less audit fees. Following Hay 
(2013), this study also control for Big 4 (BIG 4). The sign of Big 4 is expected to be 
positive due to that firms audited by Big 4 are perceived to capture high quality 
(Goncharov, et al., 2014). We also control for other impairment loss and other fair 
value assets and liabilities (OTH IMP_D, OTH FV AL), firm with going concern 
(CONCER) and firm cross listed at other exchanges. Finally, this study controls for 
year effect and industry effect.  
This study expresses dependent variable LogAF in log form to mitigate the 
effect of non-linear relation (Hay et. al., 2006; Goncharov, et al., 2014). CostIP refers 
to investment property under the cost model divided by total assets. FVIP refers to        
Investment property based on fair value model divided by total assets. NAF is the 
Natural logarithm of total non-audit fees. IMP_D, an indicator variable equal to one if 
firm charges to impairment loss and zero otherwise. LOSS, an indicator equal to one 
if firm report negative earnings and zero otherwise. AR/TA is ratio of accountable 
receivable to total assets. LEV is ratio of total debts to total assets. OTH IMP_D, an 
indicator equal to 1 if firm reports impairment loss other than impairment loss of 
investment property and zero otherwise. INTANG refers to the ratio of intangible 
assets to total assets. L DEBT, the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. ACC refers 
to absolute value of accruals, computed as difference between net income and 
operating cash flow, scaled by total assets. CA/CL refers to the ratio of current assets 
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divided by current liabilities. OPIN, an indicator equal to one if firm receive modify 
opinion and zero otherwise. CONCER is an indicator equal to one if firms receive a 
mortified opinion in current year and zero otherwise. OTH FV AL is the ratio of 
firm’s other fair-valued-assets and fair-valued-liabilities to total assets. TOTSUB 
refers to natural log of 1 plus the number of total subsidiaries. TENURE refers the 
natural log of number of years that the relationship between audit firm and client. 
BIG 4, an indicator equal to 1 if firm audited by Big 4 CPA firms and zero otherwise. 
LIST, an indicator equal to 1 if firms cross listed at another exchanges and zero 
otherwise. YEAR D, an indicator equal to 1 for individual fiscal year and zero 
otherwise.  
To test H2a, whether investment property located in the big city valued under 
the fair value model leads to higher or lower audit fees than investment property 
located in the remote city, this study conducts Model (2) by examining the interaction 
between investment properties located in the big city and fair-valued investment 
property as it affects audit fees.  
 
LogAF = ß 0 +ß1 NAF +ß2CostIP+ ß 3 FVIP + ß 4AREA + ß 5AREA*FVIP 
 + ß 6Impair_D + ß 7 LOSS + ß 8 AR/TA + ß 9 LEV + ß 10 OTH IMP_D 
 + ß 11 INTANG + ß 12 L DEBT + ß 13 ACC + ß 14 CA/CL +ß 15 OPIN + ß 16 
CONCER + ß 17 OTH FV AL + ß 18 TOTSUB + ß 19 TENURE + ß 20 BIG 4 
+ ß 21 BIG 4 + ß 22LIST + ß 23 YEAR D L+ e                     (2)  
AREA is an indicator variable equal to one if investment property located in a 
big city (developed area), and zero otherwise. The variable of interest in Model (2) is 
the interaction term AREA*FVIP. The coefficient on AREA*FVIP is expected to be 
positive if CPA firms charge higher audit fees for investment properties of firms 
located in the developed area than that investment properties of firms located in the 
undeveloped area.  
To test H2b, whether investment property based on the fair value model audited 
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by an experienced auditor of industry specialist leads to higher audit fees than that 
firm conducts fair value model audited by non-industry specialist, this study conducts 
Model (3) by examining the interaction between investment properties audited by 
industry specialist and fair-valued investment property as it affects audit fees.  
 
LogAF = ß 0 +ß1 NAF +ß2CostIP + ß 3 FVIP + ß 4 ISPEC + ß 5ISPEC*FVIP  
+ ß 6Impair_D + ß 7 LOSS + ß 8 AR/TA + ß 9 LEV + ß 10 OTH IMP_D 
+ ß 11 INTANG + ß 12 L DEBT + ß 13 ACC + ß 14 CA/CL +ß 15 OPIN 
+ ß 16 CONCER + ß 17 OTH FV AL + ß 18 TOTSUB + ß 19 TENURE  
+ ß 20 BIG 4 + ß 21LIST + ß 22 YEAR D L+ e                        (3)  
The variable of interest in Model (3) is the interaction term FVA_TA*ISPEC. 
ISPEC, an indicator equal to one if the auditor is the leading firm-level auditor in the 
real estate industry in a specific year and zero otherwise. This study expects the 
coefficient on FVA_TA*ISPEC is positive if investment property under the fair value 
model audited by industry specialist than that audited by non-industry specialists 
leads higher audit fees, because auditor specialization may capture high quality of 
audit service and charges high audit fees.   
To test H2c, whether investment property based on the fair value model 
conducted by an external appraiser leads to higher audit fees than that firm conducts 
fair value model does not conducted by external appraiser, this study conducts Model 
(4) by examining the interaction between investment properties audited by external 
appraisers and fair-valued investment property as it affects audit fees.  
LogAF = ß 0 +ß1 NAF +ß2CostIP + ß 3 FVIP + ß 4 APPR + ß 5APPR*FVIP  
+ ß 6Impair_D + ß 7 LOSS + ß 8 AR/TA + ß 9 LEV + ß 10 OTH IMP_D 
+ ß 11 INTANG + ß 12 L DEBT + ß 13 ACC + ß 14 CA/CL +ß 15 OPIN 
 + ß 16 CONCER + ß 17 OTH FV AL + ß 18 TOTSUB + ß 19 TENURE 
+ ß 20 BIG 4 + ß 21LIST + ß 22 YEAR D L+ e                  (4)  
 
The variable of interest in Model (4) is the interaction term FVA_TA*APPR. 
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APPR, an indicator equal to 1 if firm uses the external appraisers to provide 
investment property fair values and zero otherwise. This study expects the coefficient 
on FVA_TA*APPR is negative if the external appraisers provide investment property 
fair values leads lower audit fees than that provide by managers.  
 
4.2. Data collection and sample 
      This study uses a sample of Chinese firms with investment properties listed 
on China’s stock market, which consists of 264 firm-year observations spanning the 
years 2007-2014. There are 12.5% of investment properties valued at fair value 
model. We start the sample in 2007 because that is when China has substantially 
converged its accounting standards with IFRS and adopted IAS 40 investment 
property with some changes. The financial data comes from the China Securities 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 
  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
     Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables including the mean, 
median, and standard deviation used in this study. LogAF has mean (median) value of 
1.871 (1.813) with a low standard deviation (0.307), suggesting that the variation in 
audit fees of real estate firms is not high. NAF has mean (median) value of 0.144 (0) 
with a low standard deviation (0.449). CostIP has mean (median) of 0.063 (0.020) 
with standard deviation 0.108, indicating that the variation in investment property 
under the cost model is modest. FVIP has mean (median) value of 0.011 (0) with a 
very low standard deviation (0.040), suggesting that most of real estate firms use the 
cost model to measure their investment properties, and the variation in investment 
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property under the fair value model is low. Impair_D has mean (median) value of 
0.07 (0) with a low standards deviation (0.25).  
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 provides both Pearson correlation coefficients among variables used in 
this study. The Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients of NAF(LogAF ) with 
FVIP (the investment property under the fair value model) is positive and significant 
(positive but insignificant), indicating the investment property under the fair value 
model is significantly correlated with non-audit fees but not significantly correlated 
with audit fees. The correlation coefficients of LogAF with LEV, L DEBT, BIG 4, BIG 
4* FVIP are positive and significant, suggesting that audit fees is correlated with 
firms’ leverage, long-term debt, and firm audited by Big 4 CPA firms. The correlation 
coefficient of LogAF with external appraiser is negative and significant, indicating 
that firms using external appraiser reduce audit fees.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
5.2 Regression results 
Table 3 presents the regression results from estimate of equations (1), (2), (3), 
(4), and (5) which measure the association between audit fees and investment 
properties under fair value model and under cost model. All Columns of Table 3 
shows that the coefficients on investment properties measured under the fair value 
model, FV IP, are positive and significant as expected, suggesting audit fees are 
higher for firms’ investment properties reported under the fair value model than those 
reported at the cost model. The coefficients on investment properties measured under 
the cost model are negative and insignificant. The coefficients on investment 
properties measured under the cost model reporting impairment loss are positive but 
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insignificant, suggesting that investment properties reported under the cost model do 
not lead to high audit fees. The finding support H1, suggesting that audit fees are 
higher for firms’ investment property valued under the fair value model relative to 
investment property valued under the cost model due to the occur of impairment.  
Column 2 of Table 3 presents that the coefficients on the interaction of 
AREA*FVIP is negative and significant (t-statistic=-1.80), suggesting that 
investment property located in the developed areas valued under the fair value model 
leads to lower audit fees than investment property located in the remote city, our 
result, therefore, supports H2a. Colum 3 of Table 3 shows that the coefficients on the 
interaction term of SPEC*FVIP are negative but insignificant, suggesting that 
investment property valued under the fair value model audited by industry specialist 
do not lead to higher audit fees than investment property audited by non-industry 
specialist. Therefore, we fail to find evidences that support H2b. Colum 4 of Table 3 
presents that the coefficients on interaction term of APPR*FVIP is negative and 
significant (t-statistic=-1.73), indicating that the use of an independent appraiser to 
evaluate the estimates of fair-valued investment property reduces audit risk and audit 
fees, the result, therefore, support H2c.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
This study examines whether audit fees increase for firm reporting investment 
property at the fair value model, which subjects to the recognition of the changes in 
fair value of investment property in income statement, relative to firms reporting the 
cost model which subject to impairment test in the develop and less develop regions.  
 Using China’s real state firms data from 2007-2014, controlling for other 
determinants of audit fees, this study find higher audit fees for firms reporting 
investment property at the fair value model relative to those reporting investment 
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property at the cost model in the emerging market. Different from the results of 
Goncharov et al. (2014), they find higher audits fees for firm reporting investment 
property at the historical cost relative to those employing the fair value model in the 
developed markets. Our results suggest that employing fair value leads to higher 
monitoring costs in the emerging markets. Consistent with the view of the 
implementation of IFRS with the complexity of fair value-exposure increases the 
audit fees (De George, et al., 2013). This study also finds that firm reporting 
investment properties at the fair value located in the cities with active markets leads 
to lower audit fees than those located in the remote areas with less active markets. 
Different from the finding of Goncharov, et al., (2014), they find that firms 
employing external appraisers do not reduce audit fees. We provide evidence that 
firms use external appraisers to monitor the fair value estimates of investment 
properties leads low audit fees. Our result is consistent with the finding of Yao et al. 
(2015), suggesting that fair value estimates of assets monitored by external appraiser 
reduces audit fees.  
This study finds that there is no significantly difference in audit fees for firm 
using an industry specialist or not to monitor the fair value estimate of investment 
property. Overall, our result suggests that fair value accounting information leads to 
lower audit fees in the developed regions relative to less developed regions. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev 
LogAF 1.871 1.813 2.929 1.301 0.307 
NAF 0.144 0.000 2.064 0.000 0.449 
Cost IP 0.063 0.020 0.634 0.000 0.108 
FV IP 0.011 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.040 
IMP_D 0.072 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.259 
LOSS 0.057 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.232 
AR/TA 0.110 0.009 5.115 0.000 0.510 
LEV 0.608 0.638 2.401 0.015 0.219 
OTH IMP_D 0.061 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.239 
INTANG 0.021 0.002 0.362 0.000 0.053 
L DEBT 0.148 0.144 0.495 0.000 0.111 
ACC 0.091 0.021 2.059 0.000 0.221 
CA/CL 2.205 1.806 53.454 0.275 3.379 
OPIN 0.038 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.191 
CONCER 0.023 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.149 
OTH FV AL 0.000 0.000 0.011 -0.003 0.001 
TENURE 0.905 0.954 1.362 0.301 0.302 
BIG 4 0.125 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.331 
BIG 4* FVIP 0.001 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.008 
AREA 0.117 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.323 
AREA*FVIP 0.010 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.039 
D_I SPEC 0.144 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.352 
I SPEC*FVIP 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.004 
APPR  0.610 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.489 
APPR*FVIP  0.003 0.000 0.188 0.000 0.020 
LIST  0.621 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.486 
Obs 264 
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LogAF is the natural logarithm of total audit fees. 
CostIP refers to investment property under the cost model divided by total assets.  
FVIP refers to Investment property based on fair value model divided by total assets. 
NAF is the Natural logarithm of total non-audit fees.  
IMP_D, an indicator variable equal to one if firm charges to impairment loss and zero 
otherwise.  
LOSS, an indicator equal to one if firm report negative earnings and zero otherwise. 
AR/TA is ratio of accountable receivable to total assets.  
LEV is ratio of total debts to total assets.  
OTH IMP_D, an indicator equal to 1 if firm reports impairment loss other than 
impairment loss of investment property and zero otherwise.  
INTANG refers to the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. 
L DEBT, the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.  
ACC refers to absolute value of accruals, computed as difference between net income 
and operating cash flow, scaled by total assets.  
CA/CL refers to the ratio of current assets divided by current liabilities.  
OPIN, an indicator equal to one if firm receive modify opinion and zero otherwise. 
CONCER is an indicator equal to one if firms receive a mortified opinion in current 
year and zero otherwise. 
OTH FV AL is the ratio of firm’s other fair-valued-assets and fair-valued-liabilities to 
total assets.  
TOTSUB refers to natural log of 1 plus the number of total subsidiaries.  
TENURE refers the natural log of number of years that the relationship between audit 
firm and client.  
BIG 4, an indicator equal to 1 if firm audited by Big 4 CPA firms and zero otherwise.  
BIG 4* FVIP is the interaction term BIG 4* FVIP 
YEAR D, an indicator equal to 1 for individual fiscal year and zero otherwise.  
AREA is an indicator variable equal to one if investment property located in a big city 
(developed area), and zero otherwise. 
AREA*FVIP is the interaction term AREA*FVIP 
ISPEC, an indicator equal to one if the auditor is the leading firm-level auditor in the 
real estate industry in a specific year and zero otherwise. 
SPEC*FVIP is the interaction term SPEC*FVIP 
APPR, an indicator equal to 1 if firm’s investment properties under the fair value 
model conducted by external appraisers and zero otherwise 
APPR*FVIP is the interaction term APPR*FVIP 
LIST, an indicator equal to 1 if firms cross listed at another exchanges and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table 2 Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1 LogAF 1 .088 -.075 .09 -.071 -.109 .264** -.066 -.083 .209** -.226** -.133* -.061 -.044 -.04 .137* .626** .243** -.003 .041 .028 .051 -.278** -.02 -.034 
2 NAF 
 
1 -.002 .216** -.046 .034 .057 -.025 -.041 .104 -.091 -.036 -.002 .03 -.023 .130* .052 .144* .127* .194** .169** .238** .073 .002 -.133* 
3 Cost IP 
 
  1 -.126* .06 .071 -.214** -.046 .159** .062 .081 -.09 .091 .097 -.011 .034 .146* -.058 -.171** -.12 .025 -.046 -.12 -.08 -.199** 
4 FV IP 
 
    1 -.076 -.033 .082 .043 -.072 .153* -.085 -.03 -.054 -.042 -.02 .150* -.045 .168** .664** .974** -.087 .089 -.165** .460** .159** 
5 IMP_D 
 
      1 .058 -.076 -.009 .022 -.108 .072 -.024 -.055 -.042 .195** -.002 -.061 -.028 -.102 -.07 -.031 -.022 -.048 -.049 -.115 
6 LOSS 
 
        1 -.048 .143* -.013 -.186** .001 -.063 .294** .182** .015 -.128* -.093 -.024 -.039 -.03 -.007 -.019 -.106 .026 -.011 
7 LEV 
 
          1 .047 -.178** .303** -.08 -.325** .200** .302** -.033 -.049 .017 .035 .029 .074 .05 .068 -.005 .057 .032 
8 OTH IMP 
 
            1 .094 -.019 -.008 -.04 -.05 -.039 -.011 .072 -.096 -.025 .105 .051 -.059 -.02 .073 .185** .133* 
9 INTANG 
 
              1 .019 .066 -.043 -.028 -.019 .025 .204** .116 -.04 -.109 -.06 .02 -.031 .024 -.067 -.058 
10 L DEBT 
 
                1 -.125* -.054 -.136* -.066 -.051 .074 .163** .047 .179** .141* .033 .157* -.017 .155* .074 
11 ACC 
 
                  1 .028 .082 .029 -.021 -.013 -.104 -.038 -.092 -.08 -.064 -.031 .023 -.061 .106 
12 CA/CL 
 
                    1 -.062 -.03 -.001 -.086 -.067 -.009 .183** -.03 -.052 -.003 .113 -.006 .104 
13 OPIN 
 
                      1 .769** .103 -.096 -.075 -.02 -.072 -.05 -.081 -.016 -.045 -.035 .032 
14 CONCER 
 
                        1 .139* -.014 -.058 -.015 -.056 -.04 -.063 -.012 .07 -.027 -.038 
15OTH FV 
 
                          1 .034 -.036 -.007 -.027 -.02 -.015 -.006 -.081 -.013 -.101 
16 TENURE 
 
                            1 .098 .035 .072 .150* .09 .067 .008 -.034 .037 
17 BIG 4 
 
                              1 .264** -.138* -.1 -.155* -.03 -.426** -.066 -.177** 
18BIG4*FV 
 
                                1 -.036 -.03 -.041 -.008 -.125* -.017 -.128* 
19 AREA 
 
                                  1 .687** -.015 .209** .002 .428** .236** 
20AREA*FV 
 
                                    1 -.078 .093 -.151* .446** .195** 
21D_I SPEC 
 
                                      1 .192** .239** -.022 -.147* 
22 SPEC*FV 
 
                                        1 .063 .210** .062 
23 APPR 
 
                                          1 .140* .08 
24APPR*FV 
 
                                            1 .106 
25 LIST 
 
                                              1 
 
*
, 
**
 indicate statistical significance at less than the 5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 3: The association between audit fees and investment properties under fair 
value model versus under cost model and firms characters 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicate statistical significance at less than the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
 
LogAF is the natural logarithm of total audit fees. 
CostIP refers to investment property under the cost model divided by total assets.  
FVIP refers to Investment property based on fair value model divided by total assets. 
NAF is the Natural logarithm of total non-audit fees.  
IMP_D, an indicator variable equal to one if firm charges to impairment loss and zero 
 
 
ALL D_AREA D_SPEC D_APPR ALL Control 
Variable Coeff Stat Coeff Stat Coeff Stat Coeff Stat Coeff Stat 
Intercept 1.52 23.81
***
 1.53 20.87
***
 1.52 24.16
***
 1.52 22.64
***
 1.52 23.01
***
 
NAF -0.18 -4.16
***
 -0.20 -3.33
***
 -0.19 -4.41
***
 -0.19 -4.25
***
 -0.20 -4.43
***
 
Cost IP -0.20 -1.15 0.02 0.15 -0.22 -1.22 -0.20 -1.13 -0.22 -1.23 
FV IP 0.46 1.82
*
 3.81 1.97
**
 0.60 2.33
**
 0.70 2.00
**
 2.44 2.68
**
 
IMP_D 0.04 0.62 0.00 -0.09 0.05 0.82 0.04 0.63 0.05 0.82 
LOSS -0.02 -0.41 -0.05 -1.10 -0.02 -0.52 -0.01 -0.28 -0.02 -0.45 
AR/TA -0.02 -1.27 -0.05 -1.61 -0.02 -1.23 -0.02 -1.14 -0.02 -1.16 
LEV 0.25 3.83
***
 0.27 3.78
*** 
0.23 3.67
***
 0.25 3.82
***
 0.23 3.60
***
 
OTH IMP_D -0.01 -0.21 -0.07 -1.31 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.27 
INTANG -0.46 -2.02** -0.15 -0.79 -0.49 -2.26
**
 -0.48 -2.10
**
 -0.50 -2.22
**
 
L DEBT 0.00 -0.02 0.18 1.12 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.03 
ACC -0.15 -2.45
**
 -0.20 -2.57
**
 -0.14 -2.36
**
 -0.15 -2.38
**
 -0.14 -2.30
**
 
CA/CL 0.00 -1.39 0.00 -1.22 0.00 -1.45 0.00 -1.45 0.00 -1.55 
OPIN 0.04 0.84 0.03 0.53 0.05 1.05 0.05 0.92 0.06 0.99 
CONCER -0.12 -1.63 -0.18 -2.38
**
 -0.09 -1.34 -0.13 -1.69* -0.09 -1.22 
OTH FV AL 3.15 0.28 -2.16 -0.11 3.72 0.35 3.96 0.35 3.74 0.35 
TENURE 0.09 1.95
*
 0.14 2.70
***
 0.08 1.69
*
 0.09 1.80 0.07 1.53 
BIG 4 0.55 9.87
***
 
  
0.58 10.27
***
 0.56 9.27
***
 0.59 9.15
**
 
BIG 4* FVIP 
        
-2.58 -1.38 
AREA 
  
-0.03 -0.59 
    
0.03 0.61 
AREA*FVIP 
  
-3.58 -1.80* 
    
-1.74 -1.92
*
 
D_I SPEC 
    
0.11 2.73
**
 
  
0.11 2.71
**
 
SPEC*FVIP 
    
-0.43 -0.20 
  
-0.09 -0.04 
APPR 
      
0.02 0.45 0.00 0.02 
APPR*FVIP 
      
-0.82 -1.73* -1.02 -2.00** 
LIST -0.001 -0.01 -0.04 -0.92 0.01 0.34 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.25 
YEAR Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj R
2
 0.557 0.228 0.568 0.556 0.562 
Obs 264 
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otherwise.  
LOSS, an indicator equal to one if firm report negative earnings and zero otherwise. 
AR/TA is ratio of accountable receivable to total assets.  
LEV is ratio of total debts to total assets.  
OTH IMP_D, an indicator equal to 1 if firm reports impairment loss other than 
impairment loss of investment property and zero otherwise.  
INTANG refers to the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. 
L DEBT, the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.  
ACC refers to absolute value of accruals, computed as difference between net income 
and operating cash flow, scaled by total assets.  
CA/CL refers to the ratio of current assets divided by current liabilities.  
OPIN, an indicator equal to one if firm receive modify opinion and zero otherwise. 
CONCER is an indicator equal to one if firms receive a mortified opinion in current 
year and zero otherwise. 
OTH FV AL is the ratio of firm’s other fair-valued-assets and fair-valued-liabilities to 
total assets.  
TOTSUB refers to natural log of 1 plus the number of total subsidiaries.  
TENURE refers the natural log of number of years that the relationship between audit 
firm and client.  
BIG 4, an indicator equal to 1 if firm audited by Big 4 CPA firms and zero otherwise.  
BIG 4* FVIP is the interaction term BIG 4* FVIP 
YEAR D, an indicator equal to 1 for individual fiscal year and zero otherwise.  
AREA is an indicator variable equal to one if investment property located in a big city 
(developed area), and zero otherwise. 
AREA*FVIP is the interaction term AREA*FVIP 
ISPEC, an indicator equal to one if the auditor is the leading firm-level auditor in the 
real estate industry in a specific year and zero otherwise. 
SPEC*FVIP is the interaction term SPEC*FVIP 
APPR, an indicator equal to 1 if firm’s investment properties under the fair value 
model conducted by external appraisers and zero otherwise 
APPR*FVIP is the interaction term APPR*FVIP 
LIST, an indicator equal to 1 if firms cross listed at another exchanges and zero 
otherwise. 
